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Abstract: The affective revolution in Psychology has produced enough knowledge to implement abilities of emotional 
recognition and expression in robots. However, the emotional prototypes are still very basic, almost 
caricaturized ones. If the goal is constructing robots that respond flexibly, in order to fulfill market demands 
from different countries while respecting the moral values implicit in the social behavior of their 
inhabitants, then these robots will have to be programmed attending to detailed descriptions of the 
emotional experiences that are considered relevant in the interaction context in which the robot is going to 
be put to work (e.g., assisting people with cognitive or motor disabilities). The advantages of this approach 
are illustrated with an empirical study on contempt, the seventh basic emotion in Ekman’s theory, and one 
of the “rediscovered” moral emotions in Haidt’s New Synthesis. A phenomenological analysis of the 
experience of contempt in 48 Spanish subjects shows the structure and some variations –prejudiced, self-
serving, and altruistic– of this emotion. Quantitative information was later obtained with the help of blind 
coders. Some spontaneous facial expressions that sometimes accompany self-reports are also shown. 
Finally, some future directions in the Robotics-Psychology intersection are presented (e.g., gender 
differences in social behavior).  
1 INTRODUCTION 
“Our most ardent emotions are evoked not by 
landscapes, spiders, roaches, or dessert, but by other 
people.” (Pinker, 1997; p. 396) 
Humanoid robots are being constructed with 
various uses in mind. Evolutionary inspired 
psychological research, which reverse-engineer 
emotions, can be very useful to decide what 
emotions must be programmed in order to reach the 
relevant goals in different situations. If social robots 
are to be created, then moral emotions should be 
simulated, given that each one of these emotions 
seems to be, among other things, the solution to a 
social exchange problem from our evolutionary past 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2005).  
My first proposal is that current psychological 
theories on morality can help engineers to decide the 
“proper” emotions for different human-robot 
interaction situations by taking into account both the 
evolutionary roots of each emotion and the 
functionality of that emotion in the current 
interaction context. 
Impressive as they are, abilities of emotional 
recognition and expression in robots are still very 
basic ones. My second proposal is methodological: 
in order to know the structure of emotional 
experiences, descriptive phenomenology (also 
known as heterophenomenology) can be of great 
help. We can agree in that animation design and 
robots that are to be marketed in a specific culture or 
in a particular population stratum must take into 
account people’s particularities. Thus, after deciding 
what emotions need to be programmed, a detailed 
description of the experiences and facial expressions 
of people from the target culture or population 
stratum in everyday life should be obtained for the 
selected emotions. This is exactly what descriptive 
phenomenology is useful for.  
2 SOCIAL ROBOTS 
Social robots are being constructed so that their 
dispositions or behaviours take the interests, 
predicted intentions or needs of human beings into 
account. 
According to Salichs et al. (2006), the long-term 
goal of the most part of research in Robotics is to 
develop a social robot that can interact with humans 
263
 
and participate in human society. This type of robot 
must have effective and natural interfaces with a 
high level of robot autonomy. There are various 
robotic platforms that have been built to study 
human-robot social interaction. Kismet is probably 
the most popular one (Breazal & Brooks, 2005). 
Other social robots are RUBI (Fortenberry, Chenu 
& Movellan, 2004), Feelix (Cañamero & Fredslund, 
2001), and Maggie (Salichs et al., 2006), to cite just 
a few. 
It is important to note again that social behavior 
and moral emotions are intrinsically related. Known 
to the researcher or not, moral values are implicit in 
many social customs. Obviously, it is not easy for us 
to perceive how it works in our own culture, given 
that we are part of it, and so the implementation of 
capabilities of expression and recognition of the so-
called moral emotions in robotic platforms could 
also help to make explicit some values that are 
implicit in the social interaction but sometimes 
remain unseen even for the trained eye. 
2.1 Human-Robot Interaction 
Evolutionary inspired research shows that the 
human selective sensitivity to features in the human 
face that convey information on sex, age, emotions, 
and intentions is applied not only to other human 
beings or animals, but also to artificial structures, 
such as cars. (Yes, others do it too!) When people 
are asked to report the characteristics, emotions, 
personality traits, and attitudes they attribute to car 
fronts, automotive features and proportions are 
found to covary with trait perception in a manner 
similar to that found with human faces (Windhager 
et al., 2008). There is a consistent association 
between certain emotion expressions and the 
inference of some personality traits that designers 
had implicitly known and used –e.g., from the 
expression of contempt, together with some postural 
gestures, people make the inference of shyness 
(Arya, Jefferies, Enns & DiPaola, 2006). In 
animation design and Robotics, this information is 
useful to create affective production systems.  
Cañamero (2005) has reviewed the reasons why 
it would be convenient to have robots with affective 
capabilities. A common (and reasonable) 
assumption in the field is that displaying emotions 
and recognizing and responding appropriately to the 
emotional states of humans will make users more 
prone to accept robots and engage in interactions 
with them. In fact, expressive facial animation 
synthesis of human-like characters is already being 
approached with good results (see, e.g., García-
Rojas et al., 2006). 
In the Artificial Intelligence field, researchers 
have devoted much effort to solving the problem of 
emotion recognition and expression; psychological 
and even neuropsychological theories of most of the 
basic emotions –fear, sadness, surprise, happiness, 
anger, and disgust– are well known by many, and so 
I will not insist on them. I would just like to point 
out that the communicative function of emotions 
(Darwin, 1872), has been highlighted by Adolphs 
(2006) as one of the two future trends in the 
scientific study of emotion. (The other direction has 
to do with the use of neural and psychophysiological 
measures.)  
Even though the instruments derived from Paul 
Ekman's theory –such as the JACFEE test 
(Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004)– have been decisive 
in the scientific advances in the study of emotional 
expressions, a methodological change leading to 
more naturalistic, less caricaturized stimuli, is now 
required. According to Adolphs (2006), context 
effects and individual differences will have to be 
taken into account in future research projects in the 
Neurosciences, whose current procedures are 
focused on very simple prototypes. Adolphs’s 
suggestion could be applied to Robotics word for 
word. 
2.2 Moral Emotions 
 “People are selfish, yet morally motivated. Morality 
is universal, yet culturally variable. Such apparent 
contradictions are dissolving […]” (Haidt, 2007; p. 
998) 
Evolutionary theories inquiring into the origins 
of morality have focused on the study of reciprocal 
altruism (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005; Haidt, 2003; 
Trivers, 1971), a strategy that can be biologically 
successful only when participants have both the 
motivation to cooperate and the motivation to avoid 
or punish cheaters (Trivers, 1971).  
Knowledge of the latest theories on the so-called 
moral emotions is not common among AI 
researchers. Actually, neither is it among 
psychologists, given its novelty. Psychological 
research on morality had traditionally focused on the 
study of moral reasoning and on two of the moral 
emotions: guilt and empathy. A simulation of 
empathy seems to have been the dominant strategy 
in social robotics. However, in the last few years, 
increasing attention has been paid to other emotions 
such as contempt, although the interest in anger and 
disgust has somewhat obscured the role of 
contempt. The CAD (Contempt, Anger, Disgust) 
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hypothesis of Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt 
(1999), associates an emotion to each one of the 
violations of community morality. Contempt is the 
emotional response to the violations of duties 
associated with some social hierarchy, while anger 
and disgust are linked to violations of autonomy and 
purity, respectively. 
 Actually, in Haidt’s New Synthesis, the 
building blocks of human morality are the emotions, 
and moral intuition is considered as previous to 
moral reasoning. Various psychological 
foundations, each with a separate evolutionary 
origin, seem to support moral communities 
constructed by human cultures. Moral reasoning can 
override moral intuition, but it is usually performed 
with social goals in mind, i.e., to avoid being the 
target of gossip.  
The study of the moral role of emotions such as 
contempt, anger and disgust, typically considered as 
negative, is one of the most novel and promising 
fields in Psychology (Haidt, 2007).  
3 ON CONTEMPT CONSIDERED 
AS ONE OF THE MORAL 
EMOTIONS 
The expression of contempt, characteristically 
asymmetrical, is the least studied of the basic 
emotions in Ekman’s theory and the most variable 
one with respect to cultural context (Elfenbein & 
Ambady, 2002).  
Miller (1997) has described the subtle ways in 
which contempt serves in signalling and maintaining 
distinctions of rank, which is consistent with the 
CAD hypothesis. In hierarchical societies, contempt 
is shown as an assertion of the lack of importance of 
the other, who would not even deserve a strong 
feeling such as anger. In more egalitarian societies, 
however, contempt is felt for those who do not 
measure up either to social position, or to the self-
claimed level of prestige. According to Miller 
(1997), a common phenomenon in democratic 
societies is “upward contempt”, such as the 
contempt of students for teachers or daughters for 
mothers. 
From the scientific –not literary, philosophical 
or legal – point of view, contempt has hardly been 
investigated. In the context of emotion theories, 
some authors had considered contempt to be a 
variant of disgust (Ekman & Friesen, 1975), anger 
(Lazarus, 1991), or a mixture of these emotions 
(Plutchik, 1980). Ekman and Friesen (1986) 
included contempt in their list of basic emotions, 
and recent cross-cultural studies indicate that, when 
a matching procedure is used, contempt is 
recognized nearly as well as the remaining basic 
emotions (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). 
Thus, it seems that methodological factors were in 
part responsible for the confusion between disgust 
and contempt in previous studies.  
More corroborating evidence can be found in a 
recent neuropsychological experiment: disgusted 
faces elicited greater activation than contemptuous 
faces in the insula and contemptuous faces elicited 
greater activation than disgusted faces in the 
amygdala (Sambataro et al., 2006); the amygdala 
seems to be especially involved in processing face 
cues that are socially relevant. 
3.1 Meaning and Use 
There is no controversy concerning the meaning of 
the term "contempt" (the Spanish "desprecio", the 
French "mèpris", or the Italian "disprezzo"). It 
implies a feeling of superiority over someone who is 
negatively considered (Izard, 1977; Darwin, 1872, 
Ekman & Friesen, 1986). For instance, the meaning 
of the Spanish term has not changed for centuries, as 
registered in the successive dictionaries of the 
Spanish Royal Academy.  
By using frequency as an indirect indicator of 
the use of the term "desprecio", it has been found 
that contempt is an especially salient emotion in 
Spain, in contrast with other Spanish-speaking 
countries. In a study carried out on a representative 
corpus composed of 103,184 basic emotion terms 
with the objective of deciding the verbal labels for 
the seven basic emotions in Spanish, a consistently 
ordered sequence was discovered –fear, sadness, 
surprise, happiness, anger, contempt and disgust–, 
both diachronically and synchronically (in 
Colombia, Cuba, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, 
Puerto Rico, Spain, USA and Venezuela). Even 
though consistency was nearly perfect, there was an 
anomaly: in Spain, the Spanish term for contempt is 
more frequent than the Spanish term for anger, that 
is to say, contempt was the fifth and not the sixth 
term of the ordered sequence, contrary to the rest of 
the Spanish-speaking countries (Delgado, 2007). 
Concerning action tendencies, contempt is a cold 
emotion (Darwin, 1872; Izard, 1977), which makes 
it easier for a robot to express it. Contempt does not 
motivate fight or flight, but promotes cognitive 
changes so that its object is treated in a less 
considerate way in future interactions (Oatley & 
Johnson-Laird, 1996). This is probably why 
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contempt is usually evaluated as a negative emotion. 
However, there might well be situations in which 
people intuitively feel contempt for someone and 
consider it the morally appropriate answer to a 
social behavior (or lack of it).  
3.2 The Experience of Contempt 
“It seems to me that this is why, although statistical 
methods were highly productive in early 
experiments on animals, they rarely led to good, 
new ideas about the levels at which only people can 
think. This is why I want to emphasize the 
importance of trying to classify the Types of 
Problems that people recognize […]” (Minsky, 
2006; p. 252) 
Descriptive phenomenology is one of the 
expanding methodological perspectives in 
Psychology (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). The procedure 
begins with a description of an experience to be 
understood psychologically which is usually 
obtained by means of an interview and becomes the 
raw data of the research. Meaning units are first 
established and later transformed into 
psychologically sensitive expressions. Finally, the 
structure is determined. 
Lacking an external and objective measure of 
emotional experience, the analysis of the patterns of 
what people say about their feelings and mental 
representations seems to be the best point of 
departure. It is well known that self-reports do not 
reveal causal information, but they are essential for 
revealing the ontological structure of consciousness 
(Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner & Gross, 2007). Even 
though “qualia” are not themselves causal, they are 
informative indicators of causal core states; in fact, 
conscious states are the only indicators we have of 
any overall core state (Edelman, 2006).  
3.2.1 Objective 
The objective of this empirical reseach was to 
describe the structure and some variations of the 
experience of contempt by analyzing a corpus of 
interviews, as well as showing spontaneous facial 
expressions that sometimes accompany self-reports.  
3.2.2 Methodology 
Some forty-eight University students in their early 
twenties volunteered as participants.  
Data were saved on a MacBook by means of an 
iSight webcam oriented to the participant (see in 
Figure 1 how the screen is oriented to the 
interviewer so that she can control the image). To 
store, edit and analyze the videotaped interviews, 
Quicktime and iMovie were used.  
As to the procedure, participants were 
interviewed about (a) their general idea of contempt, 
(b) a typical contempt episode, and (c) a personal 
episode. Later on, they fulfilled tasks of emotional 
perception and production whose results are 
reported elsewhere.  
A descriptive phenomenological analysis was 
then carried out in order to learn the structure of the 
experience and categorize the answers following a 
bottom-up, inductive approach. The general idea of 
contempt was found to be composed of some 
qualitative elements that could be coded as present 
or absent and then added up to make a contempt 
definition score.  
 
Figure 1: A simple data-collection instrument. 
Both the prototypical and personal episodes were 
categorized by means of two concurrent category 
systems each, describing the objects and reasons of 
contempt. In order to avoid expectancy bias, results 
were quantified with the help of two “blind” coders. 
3.2.3 Qualitative Results 
Contempt was associated to (a) an avoiding attitude, 
(b) a negative experience, and (c) a feeling of 
superiority, which is consistent with the 
psychological literature on the topic, although the 
avoiding attitude was mentioned more often than 
expected for a “cold” emotion. In fact, rejection (or 
some sort of avoiding) was the most mentioned 
element, followed by the negativity of the 
experience.  
Contrary to descriptions of contempt as an 
emotion that serves mainly in signalling and 
maintaining distinctions of rank, superiority was the 
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least mentioned element. 
As to the prototypical episode, subjects often 
described situations in which a person feels 
contempt for another who has done something 
wrong to a third party, i.e., altruistic contempt, 
although contempt as prejudice was modal. Only 
three participants told a story in which the motive 
for contempt is self-serving (e.g., person A feels 
contempt for person B who has done something 
wrong to A). 
Exemplar 1: feeling contempt for someone who 
has bothered the subject. 
Exemplar 2: feeling contempt for someone who 
has commited a terrorist act. 
Exemplar 3: feeling contempt for people of a 
different race. 
More variability was found for the personal 
episode. Unexpectedly, many participants began 
telling a story in which they were the “receiver” of 
contempt (a fact that could be of clinical 
significance). This is not semantically wrong, but it 
is not what was wanted, and thus they were asked to 
report an experience in which they were the 
“sender” of contempt.  
The phenomenological analysis shows that the 
structure of the personal contempt experience is 
mostly associated with situations in which someone 
has done something wrong to the participant, 
although situations in which contempt is felt for a 
person who had done something wrong to a third 
party or whose characteristics are disliked were also 
described.  
Exemplar 1: feeling contempt for a friend who 
has despised me. 
Exemplar 2: feeling contempt for a person who 
has done something unfair to a third party. 
Exemplar 3: feeling contempt for a person 
because I dislike her clothing style. 
Both the prototypical and personal episodes were 
categorized by means of two concurrent systems 
each, describing the objects and reasons of 
contempt.  
Concerning the object of contempt, the category 
system divides the domain into three: intimate, 
social and abstract.  
As to the reasons for contempt, they are also 
classified in threes: something that the object has 
done to the subject of contempt, something that the 
object has done to a third party, and something that 
the object of contempt is (race, social role, personal 
characteristics...). These reasons have been labeled 
as self-serving, altruistic, and prejudiced, 
respectively. 
3.2.4 Quantitative Results  
Two trained observers, blind to the objectives of the 
study, used the previous systems to code the 
transcriptions and get frequency data. Inter-observer 
agreement was 97%. 
When asked for their general idea of contempt, 
participants responded with at least one term related 
to a negative experience, an avoiding attitude or a 
feeling of superiority. These elements were coded as 
present or absent and then added up to make a 
contempt definition score. Table 1 shows the 
distribution of answers with one, two or three coded 
elements, as well as the frequency distribution of 
scores.  
It can be seen that rejection or some kind of 
avoiding attitude was the most mentioned element, 
doubling in frequency the superiority aspect. 
Table 1: Contempt Definition Elements and Score. 
Avoiding Negativity Superiority Score Frequency 
1 0 0 1 13 
0 1 0 1 8 
0 0 1 1 6 
1 1 0 2 12 
1 0 1 2 5 
0 1 1 2 2 
1 1 1 3 2 
When describing a typical contempt episode, 
65% of the subjects narrated events that can be 
thought of as prejudiced, implying the feeling of 
contempt for something that the other is (race, social 
role, personal characteristics...).  
Some 29% told episodes in which a person felt 
contempt for another who had done something 
wrong to a third, i.e., altruistic contempt. Notice that 
the 95% confidence interval for this proportion goes 
from .16 to .42, not including zero.  
Table 2 shows that only three participants 
attributed direct self-serving motivations to the 
subject of contempt.  
Abstract referents (a person, someone…) were 
described by 85% of the sample, and only seven 
subjects mentioned a contempt object with which 
the subject had a social (but not intimate) 
relationship. 
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Table 2: Typical Contempt Episode: Reason by Object. 
 Intimate Social Abstract Total 
Self-serving 0 0 3 3 
Altruistic 0 0 14 14 
Prejudiced 0 7 24 31 
Total 0 7 41 48 
When describing a personal episode, there was 
more variability in the narrated events (see Table 3). 
Two subjects insisted that they had never felt 
contempt for anyone. Of the remaining forty-six, 
half described self-serving situations in which the 
objects of contempt were diverse (close friends and 
loved ones were mentioned five times in this kind of 
episode).  
Table 3: Personal Contempt Episode: Reason by Object. 
 Intimate Social Abstract Total 
Self-serving 5 8 10 23 
Altruistic 1 3 7 11 
Prejudiced 0 3 9 12 
Total 6 14 26 46 
Some twelve subjects (26% of the sample) 
described episodes that can be coded as prejudiced, 
and eleven, or 24% of the sample, described 
altruistic episodes (the 95% confidence interval for 
this proportion goes from .12 to .36, not including 
0). The object of contempt was abstract in 57% of 
the episodes, social in 30%, and intimate in 13% of 
them. 
3.2.5 Spontaneous Facial Expressions  
Some participants showed clear expressions of 
contempt while narrating their experiences. These 
expressions are more ecologically valid than the 
usual, posed ones.  
The characteristical assimetry of contempt, 
described by Darwin as “a slight uncovering of the 
canine tooth on one side of the face” (Darwin, 1872; 
p. 255), and considered by Ekman and Friesen 
(1986) as a pan-cultural expression of emotion, can 
be seen in Figure 2.  
According to Darwin (1872), another common 
method of expressing contempt is by slightly turning 
up the nose, which apparently follows from the 
turning up of the upper lip. This is the expression 
showed by the participant in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 2: A spontaneous contempt expression. 
 
Figure 3: A spontaneous disgust-as-contempt expression. 
Darwing himself indicated that mouth and nose 
movements such as those in Figure 3, when strongly 
pronounced, express disgust. Current emotion 
classifications, not taking into account either the 
intensity or the context of the expression, would 
label Figure 3 as a disgust expression.  
4 CONCLUSIONS  
The structure of the contempt experience was 
extracted from the analyses of answers to three open 
questions. First, when asked for a definition of 
contempt, participants responded with at least one 
term related to a negative experience, an avoiding 
attitude or a feeling of superiority. Rejection or 
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some kind of avoiding attitude was the most 
mentioned element, more than expected for a “cold” 
emotion. 
When describing a typical episode, subjects 
seldom mentioned episodes related to reciprocal 
altruism. More often, they narrated episodes in 
which a person felt contempt for another who had 
done something wrong to a third party, i.e., not a 
self-serving situation, but an altruistic one. 
However, experiences reflecting prejudice –feeling 
contempt for something that the other is– were 
modal. 
Finally, when describing a personal situation, 
there were mainly self-serving episodes that can be 
related to reciprocal altruism, although both 
prejudiced and altruistic contempt appeared in 
similar proportions. It must be noticed that whether 
the moral role of contempt is salient in subjects’ 
self-reports (and not only in the theorist’s mind) is 
an empirical question for which this study has found 
a positive answer. 
These results are in concordance with Haidt’s 
New Synthesis, in which contempt is the emotional 
response to the violation of some social duties. 
According to Haidt (2007) the moral domain of 
educated Westerners is more focused on principles 
of no-harm and fairness than it is in the rest of the 
world. However there are still other psychological 
foundations of morality; one of them, having to do 
with intuitions of ingroup-outgroup dynamics and 
the importance of loyalty, is clearly behind many of 
the situations that have been described by 
participants in this study. Moll, de Oliveira-Souza 
and Zahn (2008) have proposed that truly moral 
choices lie in doing something “right” (including 
punishment or avoiding of norm violators) when 
more immediate selfish motives would tell the agent 
to do otherwise. There is usually no direct benefit in 
despising terrorists or feeling contempt for people 
who mistreat other people, and thus the conception 
of altruistic contempt seems to be supported by our 
data. 
5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The next step is to begin new rounds of interviews 
with other population strata, such as old people. 
Following the trends in qualitative sampling, using 
an extreme comparison group would help to falsify 
(or else corroborate) conclusions on the structure of 
the experience of contempt.  
Pursuing the study of sex-related differences in 
contempt is another unquestionable fruitful 
direction, because morality theorists as well as 
psychologists have found some such differences in 
both morality and social communication (e.g., Hall, 
2006; Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). Given our evolutionary 
past, sex-related differences in social cognition have 
also been predicted (Kimura, 1999; Geary, 2006). 
Thus, the lack of differences in current studies could 
be attributed to procedures not taking into account 
contextual factors (Fischer & Roseman, 2007).  
Other variables such as personality type could 
also be taken into account in future studies. In any 
case, it has been shown that it is possible to 
investigate the moral concepts and expressions that 
characterize a target group by means of a very 
friendly procedure. This information should be of 
use to those who wish to market more versatile 
social robots while respecting the moral values 
implicit in the customs of the target population. 
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